University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

10-3-1969

People v. Coleman
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Coleman 71 Cal.2d 1159 (1969).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/645

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Oct. 1969]

PEoPLE V. COLEMAN
[71 C.2d 1159; 80 Cal.Rptr. 920. 459 P.2d 248)

[Crim. No. 12369.

In Bank.

1159

Oct. 3, 1969.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OTIS
RONALD COLE:M:AN, Defendant and Appellant.
[ Crim. No. 13437.

In Bank.

Oct. 3, 1969.]

. In re OTIS RONALD COLEMAN on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law-Reversible Error-Evidence-Hearsay-Accusation of Third Persons.-In a murder prosecution, it was
reversible error to pennit a police officer to testify to a witness' extrajudicial statement to the ~ffect that defendant had
asked the witness to assist him in fabricating a slip showing
the sale of the murder weapon to a codefendant prior to the
murder, where defendant had deni~d the oceurrence on crossexamination, where the witness testified that he had never seen
defendant before the trial but that the offieer had asked him
to agree that defendant had so approached him, where the
jury was not -instructed that the prior statement could be
considered only to impeach the witness' testimony, where,· in
any event, the probative value of the officer's testimony for
impeachment purposes was substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission would create substantial danger
of undue prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352), and where the officer's
testimony not only struek at a: key element in defendant's
case, but could well have been devastating to defendant's
credibility.
[2] Id. - Evidence - Hearsay - Declarations of Third Persons Witness' Prior Consistent Statements.-In a murder prosecution, it was error to admit evidence of a codefendant's prior
consistent statements under Evid .. Code, § 791, where the codefendant had pleaded guilty and testified against defendant,
and where, although defendant's testimony that the codefendant was lying amounted to an implied charge of improper
motive, there was no showing that the eonsistent statements
were made before the improper motive arose.

\

I

[1] Extrajudicial statements by witness who is subject to crossexamination as evidence of facts to which they relate, note, 133
A.L.R. 1454. See also, Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Evidence, § 515; Am.
Jur.2d, Evidence, § 500.
.
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Rev., Evidenee, § 516.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1382.1 (18); [2] Criminal Law, §429(0.5); [3] Criminal Law, §628(6); [4] Criminal
Law, § 1011(4); [5] Criminal Law, § 1011(6); [6] Criminal Law,
§ 1011(3); [7] Criminal Law, §§ 1011(3),1011(4).
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[3] Id.-Conduct of Counsel-Comment on Lack of Testimony- .
Failure of Defendant's Wife to Testify.-In a murder prosecution, it was not misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to
comment on the failure of defendant's wife to testify on his
behalf, where no question of privilege was involved (Evid.
Code, §§ 911, 970, 971), and where the wif~ was a material and
important witness to defendant's case.
[4] Id.-Judgment and Sentenc~Determination of PunishmentEvidenc~Potentia.l for Rehabilitation.-On the penalty phase
of a capital case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in 'refusing to allow the pastor of the church defendant attended while he was a teenager to testify as to his opinion of
defendant's potential for rehabilitation, where defendant had
not been a member of the witness' congregation for over 10
years before the trial.
[6] Id.-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of PunishmentEvidence-As to Prior Acts.-On the penalty phase of a capital ease, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that
defendant had engaged in fist fights and in failing to instruct
that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
fights occurred before they could consider them; such evidence
was admissible as part of deferidant's background, and a rf>asonable doubt instruction with respect thereto was not required, where the trial court instructed the jury that such
evidence was not evidence of any specific crime or crimes.
[6a, 6b] Id.-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of Punishment-Argument During Penalty Pha.se.-On the .penalty phase
of a capital ease, it was misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to argue that defendant's refusal to admit his guilt
demonstrated his lack of remorse; even after having been
found guilty, a defendant is under no obligation to confess,
and he has a right to urge his possible innocence to the jury
as a factor in mitigation of penalty.
[7] Id. - Judgment and Sentence - Determination of PenaltyArgument: Evidence.-On the penalty phase of a capital ease,
the jury may properly consider defendant's remorSe or lack
thereof in fixing the penalty; evidence on that issue is admissible; and counsel may comment thereon.

APPEAL, automatica.lly taken under Penal Code, section
1239, subdivision (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court
of Alameda County. Leonard Dieden, Judge, and PROCEEDING in habeas corpus challenging a judgment on the
verdict. Judgment reversed; writ denied.
[3J See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 436.
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first
degree murder with the penalty fixed at death reversed.
Gerald Z. Marer, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, Keogh & Marer and Keogh & Lundgren for Defendant
and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci,
John T. Murphy and Horace Wheatley, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.,

)

TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of the
first degree murder of Vincent Sulezich and fixed the penalty
at death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial or to
reduce the penalty to life imprisonment and entered judgment
on the verdict. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b).) 'Ve also have oofore us a petition for haooas corpus challenging the judgment.
Vincent Sulezich operated a cocktail bar in Newark, Cal. ifornia. He borrowed money every week from a bank to cash
. paychecks of his customers, and it was "common gossip"
that he carried large amounts of money on his person. He was
fatally shot and robbed when he returned to his home in
Oakland after work about 3 :30 a.m. on Sunday, November 20,
1966. A witness who was in a nearby apartment heard the
gunshots, went to the window, and saw two persons run to a
car in the street and drive off.
.
In February 1967, more than two months after the crime
was committed, James Stevenson went to the Oakland police
station and confessed to being one' of the participants. He
named defendant as the other. He pleaded guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to prison for life. Thereafter
he'testified against defendant at defendant's trial.
Stevenson testified that he had known defendant for from
six to eight weeks before the crime was committed and that he
had been with him many times in bars in the Newark area.
They discussed the gossip that Mr. Sulezich carried large
sums of money and developed a plan to rob him when he
returned home from work. Their first attempt failed, and they
returned the next night when the crime was committed. They
went in Stevenson's car.
Stevenson testified that he did not have a weapon and did
not know that defendant had a gun until they. parked near
the Sulezich home to wait for Mr. Sulezich to return. When

I

I

1162

ii

·

II
:;

Ii

1·

f;

I!

II
II

· !!

Ii

I;
.!
f·
1,.. '.:

•.· 1.q

I.

t:.:
1,

!

1 '
. j i

PEOPLE V. COLEMAN

[71 C.2d

they got out of the car Stevenson saw that defendant had a
gun, and defendant said, "don't worry about the gun, it will
just scare the hen out of him." After waiting under a tree
for about 45 to 60 minutes, they saw Mr. Sulezich's car approaching, and defendant ran toward the house while Stevenson stayed under the tree. Mr. Sulezich drove into the garage,
got out of his car, and walked back onto the driveway. Defendant appeared behind Mr. Sulezich and either knocked or
pushed him down. Stevenson saw a fiash and heard two shots.
He began running to his car and after five seconds he heard a
third shot. Defendant returned to the car and told Stevenson
to drive away without turning on the headlights.
Stevenson testified that he and defendant returned to defendant's home where they divided the loot, about $1,100. En
route defendant had thrown away the gun, a gun clip, bullets,
and a wallet. They stayed at defendant's home for about two
hours, and defendant took a shower and changed his' clothes
because the clothes he had been wearing were bloody. They
then drove to Niles Canyon and threw the bloody clothes in a
creek. About 7 a.m. they went to a bar in Newark. Stevenson
and his wife both testified that later in the morning Stevenson's wife, who had been looking for him to tell him he could
not come home, came to the bar and confronted Stevenson.
Defendant said to her, "now Brenda, don't be mad at Jim. HE
hasn't done anything wrong. He's been with me all night."
Later in the day Stevenson' drove defendant to San JOSf
and thereafter to the San Francisco airport. Defendant fieVi
to Baltimore and then went to Virginia where he stayed ir
various places until his arrest in February. There was evi
dence that he had several hundred dollars while he was iI
Virginia.
Police officers found the gun where Stevenson told then
defendant had abandoned it. There was ballistic evidence tha
the bullets found at the scene of the crime had been fired fror
that gun. There was also evidence that defendant bought th
gun and had it in his possession before the crime was commi1
ted.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied partie
pating with Stevenson in any way in planning or committin
the robbery and murder. He testified that he sold' his gun 1
Stevenson about a week before the crime was committed, an
that he saw it in the glove compartment of Stevenson's car
few days earlier.
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Defendant testified that he first met Stevenson in October
1966 after defendant lost his job and that he was with Stevenson from 10 to 15 times, usually at bars, until he left for
Virginia. A few days before the crime was committed defendant decided to return to Virginia, where he had fonnerlv
lived, because he was out of work and unable to support his
family and had heard that if he left home his wife could
recieve welfare support for herself and the children. Defendant arranged for Stevenson to pick him up on Sunday, November 20, 1966, the day of the crime. They were to leave
defendant's home about 8 a.m. and Stevenson was to drive
him to Highway 101 in San Jose so that defendant could
hitchhike east.
Defendant testified that on Saturday evening he was with
Stevenson, another friend, and his brother-in-law at a bar in
Newark. About midnight defendant, his brother-in-law, and
Stevenson went to another bar where defendant and his brother-in-law had a drink. Stevenson stayed outside and met a
friend whose name defendant· did not remember. Defendant's
brother-in-law. took him home shortly before 1 a.m., and defendant stayed at home the rest of the night and did not see
Stevenson again until the next morning. Stevenson arrived
around 6 or 7 a.m. and took defendant to the bar where later
in the morning defendant sought to placate Stevenson's wife
by telling her that he had been with Stevenson all night.
Thereafter Stevenson drove defendant to San Jose and then
to the airport and lent him money for plane fare and the trip
to Virginia. Defendant and a defense witness testified that
defendant won by gambling the several hundred dollars that he
had in Virginia.
.
[1] . Defendant. contends that it was prejudicial error to
admit into evidence a hearsay statement of witness Hood that
defendant had approached Hood in jail and asked him to
secure Stevenson's signature on a piece of paper so that defendant could fabricate a sales slip for the murder weapon.
We agree with this contention.
Defendant testified that when he sold the murder weapon to
Stevenson about a week before the crime was committed, he
did not request or receive a receipt for the sale. On crossexamination he denied that he ever attempted to procure
Stevenson's signature for the purpose of making a false receipt as evidence of the alleged sale of the gun. In rebuttal the
prosecution called Hood, who had been an inmate in the same
jail with defendant and Stevenson before defendant's trial.

't
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Hood testified that he had never seen defendant before he saw
him at the trial. Hood also stated that a police officer, Inspector
Hughes, had tried to get him to agree that defendant had
asked him to procure Stevenson's signature but that he had
told Inspector Hughes that no such request was made of him.
Inspector Hughes was then called and testified over objection to a conversation that he had with Hood in which
Hood stated that defendant had asked Hood to secure
Stevenson's signature on a piece of paper that could be used
to create a false sales slip for the gun to be predated before
the Sulezich murder.
Since Hood's prior statement was used to prove the truth
of the matter therein asserted, defendant's constitutional right
to confront the witness against him was violated. (U.S.
Const., 6th and 14th Amends.; People v. Johnson (1968) 68
Ca1.2d 646 [68 Cal.Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111] ; People v. Green
(1969) 70 Ca1.2d 654 [75 Cal.Rptr. 782, 451 P.2d 422] ; People v. Odom (1969) 71 Ca1.2d 709, 713-716 [78 Cal.Rptr.
873, 456 P .2d 145].) As in Odom, the trial in this case occurred after the effective date of the Evidence Code permitting
~uch use (Evid. Code, § 1235) and before the decision of this
rlourt in the Johnson case holding section 1235 unconstitutional as applied against' a defendant in a criminal case.
The jury was not instructed that the prior statment could be
considered only to impeach Hood's testimony. Moreover, the
prosecuting attorney forcefully argued that Hughes' testimony setting forth Hood's statement was evidence that
Hood's conversation with defendant occurred.
It must also be noted that the error was not limited to the
failure to restrict the jury's consideration of Hood's statement to impeachment of Hood's testimony. That statement
was not admissible at all, for its probative value to impeach
Hood's testimony was obviously" substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice." (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Hood's testimony that he had not seen defendant before he
saw him at the trial and that defendant had not asked him to
secure Stevenson's signature detracted not at all from the
prosecution's case before the jury. At most the prosecution
was denied advantageous testimony that it may have hoped to
elicit, even though it knew before it put Hood on the stand
that he would not testify as the prosecution wished. Accordingly, proof that Hood was a liar was of benefit to the prosecution only if the jury were to believe the truth of Hood'8
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prior statement. The prosecution, however, was not entitled to
that benefit, and the risk that it might improperly secure that
benefit by impeaching Hood far outweighed any legitimate
interest the prosecution had in such impeachment.
The error in permitting the jury to consider Hood's statement as evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein
was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights and compels reversal, for we are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless. (Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 8.Ct. 824] ;
People v. Odom, supra, 71 Cal.2d 709, 717.)
The jury was confronted with a direct conflict between Stevenson's testimony and defendant's testimony as to defendant's participation in the crime, and it is impossible to determine how the jury would have resolved that conflict had it
not had before it inadmissible hearsay evidence that defendant attempted to fabricate a false sales slip to dissociate himself from the murder weapon. Not only did the erroneously
admitted evidence strike at a key element in defendant's case,
it could well have been devastating to defendant's credibility.
It is therefore reasonably possible that it contributed to the result. (Chapman v. Californw, supra, 3$6 U.S. 18,24; Fahy v.
Cownecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 172173, 84 8.Ct. 229] ; see also Harrington v.California (1969)
395 U.s. 250, 254 [23 L.Ed.2d 284, 287-288, 89 S.Ct. 1726,
1728].)
We now turn.to contentions that ~ay arise on retrial.
[2] Defendant contends tha.t it was error to admit evidence that Stevenson had made statements to his father and
wife that were consistent with his testimony at ilie trial.
These statements were made before Stevenson turned himself
in to the police. They were admitted in evidence in rebuttal
after Stevenson had testified on. cross-examination that he
turned himself in, pleaded guilty, and received a life sentence
and after defendant had testified that he had not been with
Stevenson at the time of the crime and characterized Stevenson's testimony implicating defendant as lies. Over objection,
the trial court admitted the statements under section 791 of
the Evidence Code, which provides: "Evidence of a statement made by a. witness that is consistent with his testimony
at the hearing is inadmissible to support his credibility unless
it is offered after: . . . (b) An express or implied charge
has been made that his testimony at the hearing is recently
fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive,
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and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen."
Although defendant made no charge of recent fabrication
or bias and no express charge of other improper motive, we
agree with the Attorney General's contention that defendant's testimony that Stevenson was lying was an implied
charge that Stevenson had confessed to a lesser role in the
crime and named defendant as the killer for the improper
motive of falsely placing the major blame on defendant so
t.hat Stevenson might not receive the death penalty. To
establish the admissibility of the prior consistent statements
under subdivision (b) of section 791, however, it was also
incumbent on the prosecution' to show that the statements
were made before the improper motive "is alleged to have
aris~n. " Since defendant did not expressly allege any improper motive, he did not expressly allege when any such
!llotive may have arisen. By implication, however, defendant
alleged that it arose when Stevenson decided to protect himself at defendant's expense. There is no reason to believe
that such improper motive, if any, did not arise before Stevenson decided to confess his' Involvement in the crime to his
father and his wife. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with
defendant's implied charge of improper motive that it arose
immediately after the murder, when Stevenson realized the
predicament he was in, or after he had reflected on the likelihood that he would be caught but that perhaps defendant
would not be, or even before .the murder was committed, if,
as defendant implied, Stevenson was with another person
when the crime was committed and knew that defendant
would be leaving the state on the following day. Accordingly,
the prosecution did not show that when Stevenson implicated
defendant in his statements to his father and his wife, the
alleged improper motive had not already arisen. I t was
therefore error to admit the prior consistent statements into
evidence. l
IPeople v. Duvall (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 417 [68 Ca1.Rptr. 708], is
not to the contrary. In that case the implied charge of improper motive
referred to a specific time, namely, when the accomplice-witnesses were
impliedly charged with making a "deal" with the district attorney. Prior
consistent statements made before that time were therefore properly admitted. In the present case, however, there was no implied charge that
Stevenson's improper motive arose out of a "deal" with the prosecution
and therefore arose at the time such a "deal" was made. The implication was that he approached the police with an already concocted story
that cast himself in the best possible light.
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[3] Defendant contends that the prosecuting attorney
committed misconduct by commenting on the failure of defendant's wife to testify on his behalf. 'Ve do not agree with
this contention.
Before the enactment of the Evidence Code it was misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to comment on the failure
of a defendant's spouse to testify for the defendant. (People
v. Wilkes (1955) 44 Cal.2d 679,687 [284 P.2d 481], and cases
cited.) At that time, however, neither spouse could testify
for or against the other without the consent of both. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 1; Pen. Code, § 1322; both repealed
effective Jan. 1, 1967.) Accordingly, it was improper to
comment on the defendant's spouse's failure to testify, for
the defendant could not compel his spouse to testify either
for or against him. Under the provisions of the Evidence
Code, however, a defendant's spouse has no privilege not to
testify for the defendant, and the defendant has no privilege'
to preven.t his spouse from testifying for or against him.
(Evid. Code, §§ 911, 970, 971.) Comment on a wife's failure
to testify for her defendant husband does not, therefore, constitute comment on the exercise of a privilege that defendant
has (see Evid. Code, § 913) or on his failure to call a witness
that he cannot compel to testify on his behalf. Since defendant's failure to call his wife was a failure to call a material
and important witness, his not doing so could be considered
by the jury and commented upon by the prosecuting attorney.
(See Evid. Code, § 412; People v. Carter (1953) 116 Cal.
App.2d 533, 539 [253 P.2d 1016].)
[4] Defendant contends that at the trial on the issue of
penalty, the trial court erred in refusing to allow the pastor
. of the church defendant attended while he was a teenager
. to testify as to his opinion of defendant's potential for rehabilitation. Although the pastor of the defendant's church
will frequently be qualified to give an opinion with respect to
the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, it is for the trial
court to determine whether in a particular case, the pastor's
opportunities to know and observe the defendant were suffi;.
cient to provide a basis for a meaningful opinion. In the
present case, defendant had not been a member of the witness' congregation for over ten years before the trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow the witness to state his opinion. (See People v. Davis
(1965) 62 Ca1.2d 791, 801 [44 Cal.Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142].)
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[5] Defendant contends that at the trial on the issue of
penalty, the trial court erred in admitting evidence that
defendant had engaged in fist fights and in faiJing to instruct
that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
fights occurred before it could consider them. Evidence that
defendant engaged in fist fights, however, was admissible as
part of his background and history (Pen. Code, § 190.1), and
since the trial court instructed the jury that such evidence
was "not evidence of any specific crime or crimes," a reasonable doubt instruction with respect thereto was not required.
[6&] Defendant contends that at the trial on the issue of
penalty, the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by
arguing that defendant's refusal· to admit his guilt demonstrated his lack of remorse. The prosecuting attorney stated:
"There he sits. A murderer. A robber-murderer. Remorse!
1Vhere is the remorse T ••• A man who, to this very day,
will not get on that stand aud admit what he has done . . • .
You are dealing with a cunning individual, a man who
refuses, up to this very minute I am talking to you now, to
admit his guilt; . . . a care-less individual."
[7] The jury may properly consider the defendant's remorse or lack thereof in fixing the penalty. Evidence on that
issue is therefore admissible, and counsel may comment
thereon. (People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691, 712 [51
Cal.Rptr. 417, 414 P.2d 633].) [6b] It does not- follow,
however, that every inference bearing on the question of
remorse may be urged upon the jury by counsel. It is fundamentally unfair to urge, as was done here, that a defendant's
failure to confess his guilt after he has been found guilty
demonstrates his lack of remorse and that therefore such
failure should be considered as a ground for· imposing the
death penalty. Even after he has been found guilty, a defendant is under no obligation to confess, and he has a right to
urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitigation of penalty. (People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 145147 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) A defendant would
be placed in an intolerable dilemma if his failure to confess
following conviction could be urged at the trial on the issue
of penalty as evidence of lack· of remorse. To silence such
arffument, a defendant who had denied his guilt at the trial
on the issue of guilt would have to admit or commit perjury
at the trial on the issue of penalty. and he could do neither
without in effect forfeiting his right to urge the trial court
on motion for new trial to reweigh the evidence on the issue
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of guilt. We conclude that any argument that failure to
confess should be deemed evidence of lack of remorse is not
pennissible.
By petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed while this
appeal was pending, defendant contends that it was error
to admit evidence that he had been convicted of burglary
in Virginia, on the ground that he was denied effective representation of counsel in the Virginia proceedings. Since
defendant did not challenge the validity of his prior conviction at the trial, there is nothing in the record on appeal to
support defendant's contention. We issued an order to show
cause in the habeas corpus proceeding, however, so that we
could determine, if necessary, whether the evidence of the
prior conviction vitiated the judgment before us on the
automatic appeal. Since the judgment must be reversed on
other grounds, the validity of the prior conviction can be
detennined on retrial in accord with the procedure set forth
in People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217-218 [60 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]. Accordingly, our order to show
cause will be discharged.
The judgment in Crim. No. 12369 is reversed.
The order to show cause in Crim. No. 13437 is discharged,
and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J.,
concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent from that part of the opinion that
reverses the judgment in Crim. No. 12369, and would affirm
the judgment.
I concur with that part of the opinion discharging the
.order to show cause in Crim. No. 13437 and denying the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

